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EXTENDED VISUAL CRYPTOGRAPHY SCHEMES
ANDREAS KLEIN AND MARKUS WESSLER
Abstract. Visual cryptography schemes have been introduced in 1994 by Naor and
Shamir. Their idea was to encode a secret image into n shadow images and to give
exactly one such shadow image to each member of a group P of n persons. Whereas most
work in recent years has been done concerning the problem of qualified and forbidden
subsets of P or the question of contrast optimizing, in this paper we study extended
visual cryptography schemes, i.e. shared secret systems where any subset of P shares its
own secret.
1. Introduction
A visual cryptography scheme is given by the following set up. Let P be a group of n
persons where each participant is given exactly one image (in fact it does not have to
be a real image) xeroxed onto a transparency. Stacking all the transparencies together,
a secret image is recovered. So in this sense the participants share a secret. This set
up can be generalized to the case where some subsets X ⊆ P (which are usually called
qualified subsets of P ) can recover the secret by stacking their transparencies together,
whereas other, forbidden subsets cannot. Such structures, called access structures, have
been examined very well. In [5] Naor and Shamir analysed so-called (k, n)-threshold visual
cryptography schemes, i.e. schemes where a subset is qualified if and only if it consists of
at least k participants. In [1] and [2] their idea was extended to general access structures.
Most work concerning this subject focuses on two aspects, either the pixel expansion, i.e.
the number of subpixels which is needed on the different levels to represent a white or a
black pixel, or the contrast, i.e. the difference of subpixels representing a white or a black
pixel.
As a further generalization, the existence of a secret image can be concealed by displaying
a different image on each slide. Naor and Shamir [5] solved this problem for the (2, 2)-
threshold scheme. In [3] this problem was considered for a general access structure. In
[4] Droste made a further generalization: Stacking the transparencies of each participant
together, a secret image is recovered, and there is in fact only this single way to recover it.
But moreover, the participants of any arbitrary subset X of P share a secret, too. Hence
we have 2n − 1 more or less secret images.
We start by briefly recalling the work done by Droste and prove that the scheme proposed
in [4] has minimal pixel expansion. Then we prove a trade-off theorem between the contrast
of the different images.
Finally we give new constructions for generalized visual cryptography schemes with less
then 2n − 1 subsets in order to achieve a smaller pixel expansion and a better contrast.
2. Preliminaries
A visual cryptography scheme is based on the fact that each pixel of an image is divided
into a certain number m of subpixels. This number m is called the pixel expansion of the
image. If the number of black subpixels needed to represent a white pixel in an image is
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l, and the number of black subpixels needed to represent a black pixel is h, then we call
the number α = h−l
m
the contrast of the image.
An extended visual cryptography scheme consists of n transparencies τ1, . . . , τn and 2
n−1
different images (one for each non-empty subset T ⊆ {1, · · · , n}). We denote by IT the
image which is recovered by stacking together exactly the transparencies τi for i ∈ T .
We generalize this as follows. For any non-empty subset S ⊆ P({1, · · · , n})\{∅} an
S-extended visual cryptography scheme consists of n transparencies τ1, . . . , τn with the
following property: Let T ∈ S. If we stack together the slides τi for i ∈ T , then we
recover the image IT for which each white pixel is represented by lT black subpixels and
each black pixel is represented by hT black subpixels. Furthermore, for T
′ not contained
in T , the distribution of subpixels on the transparencies τi with i ∈ T is independent of
the image IT ′ , i.e. the information of the transparencies τi with i ∈ T does not suffice to
recover the image IT ′ .
More formally, we define an S-extended visual cryptography scheme as follows. (See also
[5] for “usual” visual cryptography schemes and [4] for S-extended visual cryptography
schemes.)
Definition 2.1. Let S ⊆ P({1, . . . , n})\{∅}.
An S-extended visual cryptography scheme is described by multi-sets CT of n×m Boolean
matrices for T ⊆ S. (For given T each Boolean matrix in CT describes the colors of the
subpixels on each transparency, where the corresponding pixel in image IT is black if and
only if T ∈ T. For encoding, each matrix in CT is chosen with the same probability.)
The multi-sets CT must satisfy the following conditions:
(1) Let B ∈ CT. For {i1, . . . , iq} ∈ S the Hamming weight of the OR of the rows
i1, . . . , iq of B is h{i1,...,iq} if {i1, . . . , iq} ∈ T and l{i1,...,iq} otherwise, i.e.
wHam((bi1,1, . . . , bi1,m) OR . . . OR (biq ,1, . . . , biq,m)) =
{
h{i1,...,iq} if {i1, . . . , iq} ∈ T
l{i1,...,iq} if {i1, . . . , iq} /∈ T
.
(This means stacking the transparencies τi1 , . . . , τiq together we recover the image
I{i1,...,iq}.)
(2) For {i1, . . . , iq} ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and T,T
′ ⊆ S with T ∩ P({i1, . . . , iq}) = T
′ ∩
P({i1, . . . , iq}) we obtain the same multi-sets if we restrict the matrices in C
T
and CT
′
respectively to the rows i1, . . . , iq.
(This condition guarantees the security of the different images.)
If S = P({1, . . . , n})\{∅} we simply call this an extended visual cryptography scheme.
In [4] Droste gives the following construction for S-extended visual cryptography schemes
using (k, k)-threshold schemes.
Construction 2.2. For each T ∈ S we take 2|T |−1 subpixels and use them to construct a
(|T |, |T |)-threshold visual cryptography scheme. If i /∈ T the corresponding subpixels on τi
will be black. The S-extended visual cryptography scheme is achieved by putting all these
schemes together. Since we shall not need the details of this construction in the sequel, we
omit a formal definition and refer to [4].
The scheme obtained by this construction has pixel expansion
m =
∑
T∈S
2|T |−1
and the contrast of all encoded images is 1
m
. We shall prove in the following sections that
this construction is optimal if S = P({1, . . . , n})\{∅} but it is not optimal for general S.
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3. Pixel Expansion and Contrast for the Extended Scheme
It is sufficient to consider the case of one single pixel. For a given non-empty subset T ⊆
{1, . . . , n} let xT be the number of subpixels which are black exactly on the transparencies
i for i ∈ T and let us denote by x the vector of all the xT . For ∅ 6= S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} let rS
be the number of black subpixels needed for the image IS . Formally we set r∅ = 0. We
write r for the vector of all the rS with ∅ 6= S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}.
This leads to the linear equation system given by
(1) Mx = r
where M = (mS,T )∅6=S,T⊆{1,...,n} is defined by mS,T = 1 if S ∩ T 6= ∅ and mS,T = 0
otherwise.
Lemma 3.1. Equation (1) has a unique integral solution.
Proof. We prove this by induction on the number n of transparencies. Writing M1 = (1),
we obtain the following recursion formula which follows directly from the definition:
Mn+1 =

Mn 0 Mn0 1 1
Mn 1 1

 .
Here the index denotes the number of transparencies.
Let en denote the (2
n − 1) dimensional vector (1, . . . , 1)t. With M−11 = (1) we obtain the
following recursion formula for M−1n :
M−1n+1 =

 0 −M−1n en M−1n−etnM−1n 0 etnM−1n
M−1n M
−1
n en −M
−1
n


We notice that the components of M−1n en are only −1, 0 and 1 and that e
t
nM
−1
n en = 1.
Then the formula can be proved by induction.
Thus M−1n contains only the entries −1, 0 and 1 and therefore equation (1) has an integral
solution. 
Lemma 3.2. The solution of (1) is non-negative if and only if for each S ( {1, . . . , n}
the condition
(2)
∑
S⊆T⊆{1,...,n}
(−1)|S|+|T |rT ≤ 0
is satisfied.
Proof. We claim that x = (xS) with
(3) xS =
∑
{1,...,n}\S⊆T⊆{1,...,n}
(−1)|T |+|S|+n+1rT
solves equation (1) and due to Lemma 3.1 this solution is unique.
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To prove this we substitute x in equation (1). For ∅ 6= U ⊆ {1, . . . , n} the line of the
system of linear equations corresponding to U yields∑
∅6=S⊆{1,...,n}
mU,SxS =
∑
S⊆{1,...,n}
mU,S
∑
{1,...,n}\S⊆T⊆{1,...,n}
(−1)|T |+|S|+n+1rT
=
∑
T⊆{1,...,n}
∑
{1,...,n}\T⊆S⊆{1,...,n}
(−1)|T |+|S|+n+1rTmU,S
=
∑
∅6=T⊆{1,...,n}
(−1)|T |rT
∑
{1,...,n}\T⊆S⊆{1,...,n}
(−1)|S|+n+1mU,S .
(4)
If T 6⊆ U we choose t ∈ T\U and obtain∑
{1,...,n}\T⊆S⊆{1,...,n}
(−1)|S|+n+1mU,S
=
∑
{1,...,n}\{T∪{t}}⊆S⊆{1,...,n}\{t}
(−1)|S|+n+1mU,S + (−1)
|S|+1+n+1mU,S∪{t} = 0
since mU,S = mU,S∪{t}.
If T ( U and T 6= ∅ we find∑
{1,...,n}\T⊆S⊆{1,...,n}
(−1)|S|+n+1mU,S =
∑
{1,...,n}\T⊆S⊆{1,...,n}
(−1)|S|+n+1 = 0
since mU,S = 1.
But for ∅ 6= T = U we find∑
{1,...,n}\T⊆S⊆{1,...,n}
(−1)|S|+n+1mU,S =
∑
{1,...,n}\T⊆S⊆{1,...,n}
(−1)|S|+n+1 − (−1)|{1,...,n}\U |+n+1
= (−1)|{1,...,n}\U |+n
since mU,S = 1 for S 6= {1, . . . , n}\U .
Thus equation (4) yields∑
∅6=S⊆{1,...,n}
mU,SxS =
∑
∅6=T⊆{1,...,n}
(−1)|T |rT
∑
{1,...,n}\T⊆S⊆{1,...,n}
(−1)|S|+n+1mU,S
= (−1)|U |rU(−1)
|{1,...,n}\U |+n
= (−1)2nrU = rU .
This proves that x is a solution of equation (1) and the lemma follows. 
Now we can solve (2) to derive bounds for the pixel expansion and the contrast.
Theorem 3.3. An extended visual cryptography scheme with n transparencies needs at
least 12 (3
n − 1) subpixels. Hence Construction 2.2 is optimal with respect to the pixel
expansion.
Proof. First we note that the inequality (2) is as strong as possible if rT = hT for |S|+ |T |
even and rT = lT for |S|+ |T | odd.
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Thus an extended visual cryptography scheme exists if and only if
(5)
∑
S⊆T⊆{1,...,n}
|S|≡|T | mod 2
hT ≤
∑
S⊆T⊆{1,...,n}
|S|6≡|T | mod 2
lT
holds for each S ( {1, . . . , n}.
For each ∅ 6= T ⊆ {1, . . . , n} let δT = hT − lT . Our goal is to prove that
(6) m ≥ h{1,...,n} ≥
∑
∅6=T⊆{1,...,n}
δT 2
|T |−1 .
As the first step in this proof we show that, for given values δT (for ∅ 6= T ⊆ {1, . . . , n}),
the number h{1,...,n} is minimal if for all S ( {1, . . . , n} inequality (5) is satisfied with
equality.
To this end, suppose ∑
S⊆T⊆{1,...,n}
|S|≡|T | mod 2
hT <
∑
S⊆T⊆{1,...,n}
|S|6≡|T | mod 2
lT
for some S ( {1, . . . , n}. But the contrast levels
h¯T =
{
hT for T ⊆ S
hT − 1 otherwise
and
l¯T =
{
lT for T ⊆ S
lT − 1 otherwise
satisfy (5), since
|{T | S ⊆ T ⊆ {1, . . . , n}; |T | ≡ |S| mod 2;T 6⊆ S}| =
|{T | S ⊆ T ⊆ {1, . . . , n}; |T | 6≡ |S| mod 2;T 6⊆ S}| .
Thus we may assume that inequality (5) is satisfied with equality for each S ( {1, . . . , n}.
Next we claim that
(7) hT =
∑
∅6=T ′⊆{1,...,n}
δT ′2
|T ′|−1 −
∑
T(T ′⊆{1,...,n}
δT ′2
|T ′|−1−|T |
for ∅ 6= S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} satisfy (5) with equality.
To prove this we have to show that
∑
S⊆T⊆{1,...,n}
|S|≡|T | mod 2

 ∑
∅6=T ′⊆{1,...,n}
δT ′2
|T ′|−1 −
∑
T(T ′⊆{1,...,n}
δT ′2
|T ′|−1−|T |

 =
∑
S⊆T⊆{1,...,n}
|S|6≡|T | mod 2



 ∑
∅6=T ′⊆{1,...,n}
δT ′2
|T ′|−1 −
∑
T(T ′⊆{1,...,n}
δT ′2
|T ′|−1−|T |

− δT


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or equivalently
∑
∅6=T ′⊆{1,...,n}
δT ′

 ∑
S⊆T⊆{1,...,n}
|S|≡|T | mod 2
2|T
′|−1 −
∑
S⊆T(T ′
|S|≡|T | mod 2
2|T
′|−1−|T |

 =
∑
∅6=T ′⊆{1,...,n}
δT ′

 ∑
S⊆T⊆{1,...,n}
|S|6≡|T | mod 2
2|T
′|−1 −
∑
S⊆T(T ′
|S|6≡|T | mod 2
2|T
′|−1−|T |

+δT ′ (−1)|T
′|+|S| − 1
2
.
(Note that the last summand is equal to −δT ′ for |T
′| 6≡ |S| mod 2 and equal to 0
otherwise.)
Comparing coefficients for each δT ′ we obtain
2n−|S|−1 · 2|T
′|−1 −
∑
S⊆T(T ′
|S|≡|T | mod 2
2|T
′|−1−|T | =
2n−|S|−1 · 2|T
′|−1 −

 ∑
S⊆T(T ′
|S|6≡|T | mod 2
2|T
′|−1−|T |

+ (−1)|T
′|+|S| − 1
2
,
but this is true since
(−1)|T
′|−|S| = (1− 2)|T
′|−|S| =
∑
S⊆T⊆T ′
|T ′|≡|T | mod 2
2|T
′|−|T | −
∑
S⊆T⊆T ′
|T ′|6≡|T | mod 2
2|T
′|−|T | .
Suppose that h¯T (for ∅ 6= T ⊆ {1, . . . , n}) satisfy (5) with equality, too. For S 6= ∅
inequality (5) gives
h¯S = hS + h¯{1,...,n} − h{1,...,n}.
But for S = ∅ inequality (5) yields h¯{1,...,n} = h{1,...,n} and therefore h¯T = hT for all
∅ 6= T ⊆ {1, . . . , n}.
This proves that (7) is the only solution of (5) that satisfies all inequalities with equality.
Thus we find
m ≥ h{1,...,n} ≥
∑
∅6=T ′⊆{1,...,n}
δT ′2
|T ′|−1 ≥
∑
∅6=T ′⊆{1,...,n}
2|T
′|−1 =
1
2
(3n − 1) .

Next we prove a trade-off between the contrast of the different images.
Theorem 3.4. For ∅ 6= T ⊆ {1, . . . , n} let αT =
hT−lT
m
be the contrast of the image IT .
The contrast levels of the images satisfy
(8)
∑
∅6=T⊆{1,...,n}
2|T |−1αT ≤ 1 .
Further let α′T ≥ 0 (for ∅ 6= T ⊆ {1, . . . , n}) satisfy (8) . Then for every ε > 0 there exists
a generalized visual cryptography scheme with contrast levels αT (for ∅ 6= T ⊆ {1, . . . , n})
where |αT − α
′
T | < ε for nonempty subsets T of {1, . . . , n}.
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Proof. Let δT = hT − lT . By (7) we conclude
m ≥ h{1,...,n} ≥
∑
∅6=T⊆{1,...,n}
δT 2
|T |−1
and therefore ∑
∅6=T⊆{1,...,n}
2|T |−1αT =
1
m
∑
∅6=T⊆{1,...,n}
δT 2
|T |−1 ≤ 1 .
Now assume (8) holds for α′T . Then we choose δT ∈ N and M ∈ N with
0 ≤ α′T −
δT
M
≤ ε .
By (7) we know that there exists an extended visual cryptography scheme with contrast
levels hT − lT = δT and minimal pixel expansion
m =
∑
∅6=T⊆{1,...,n}
2|T |−1δT .
Since δT
M
≤ α′T and αT ′ satisfy (8) we find m <M .
If we add useless subpixels (e.g. subpixels that are always black) to the extended visual
cryptography scheme constructed above, we obtain a scheme with contrast αT =
δT
M
. This
proves the theorem. 
4. Pixel Expansion and Contrast for the S-Extended Scheme
In the previous section we proved that Construction 2.2 is optimal ifS = P({1, . . . , n})\{∅}.
If we set δT = 1 for T ∈ S and δT = 0 for T /∈ S in equation (7) we obtain the same
contrast values as in Construction 2.2. In this sense Construction 2.2 can be viewed
as a (P({1, . . . , n})\{∅})-extended visual cryptography scheme with degenerated contrast
values.
Theorem 4.1. Let S = P({1, . . . , n})\{∅, {1, . . . , n}} then Construction 2.2 is optimal if
and only if n is odd.
Proof. Let δT = 1 for ∅ 6= T ( {1, . . . , n} and δ{1,...,n} = 0. Then hT and lT = hT − δT as
in (7) satisfy (5) and these are the solutions given by 2.2.
Let us assume n is even. We show that in this case we can find a better construction
in the sense that fewer subpixels are required. Setting hT = hT − 1 and lT = lT − 1 for
∅ 6= T ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and h∅ = l∅ = 0 we observe that inequality (5) still holds for all S 6= ∅.
Thus the solution x = (xT )∅6=T⊆{1,...,n} of equation (1) satisfies xT ≥ 0 for T 6= {1, . . . , n}.
The value of x{1,...,n} will be non-negative unless rT = hT for |T | even and rT = lT for
|T | odd. In this special case equation (3) gives the solution x{1,...,n} = −1. To obtain a
solution with positive x{1,...,n} we adjust the value of r{1,...,n} from h{1,...,n} to h{1,...,n}− 1.
(This is possible, since {1, . . . , n} 6∈ S which means that the number of black subpixels in
the stack of all transparencies does not matter.) Now (3) reveals the solution
x{1,...,n} =
∑
T⊆{1,...,n}
(−1)|T |+1rT
=
∑
T⊆{1,...,n}
|T | odd
lT −

 ∑
T⊆{1,...,n}
|T | even
hT

+ 1 = −1 + 1 = 0.
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For S 6= {1, . . . , n} and |S| even we obtain
xS =
∑
{1,...,n}\S⊆T⊆{1,...,n}
(−1)|T |+|S|+n+1rT
=
∑
{1,...,n}\S⊆T⊆{1,...,n}
|T | odd
lT −

 ∑
{1,...,n}\S⊆T⊆{1,...,n}
|T | even
hT

+ 1 = 0 + 1 = 1.
For |S| odd we obtain
xS =
∑
{1,...,n}\S⊆T⊆{1,...,n}
(−1)|T |+|S|+n+1rT
=

 ∑
{1,...,n}\S⊆T⊆{1,...,n}
|T | even
hT

− 1− ∑
{1,...,n}\S⊆T⊆{1,...,n}
|T | odd
lT
>
∑
{1,...,n}\S⊆T⊆{1,...,n}
|T | even
lT −

 ∑
{1,...,n}\S⊆T⊆{1,...,n}
|T | odd
hT

− 1 = −1.
Thus all possible values of r lead to non-negative solutions for x, hence an S-extended
visual cryptography scheme with m = h{1,...,n} < h{1,...,n} exists, i.e. the solution given by
2.2 is not optimal.
Now we assume n is odd. Let hT and lT (∅ 6= T ( {1, . . . , n})) be a solution of (5) different
from hT and lT . Let h{1,...,n} be the maximal number of black subpixels occurring when
all the transparencies are stacked together.
Since hT and lT solve inequality (5), we can apply the same arguments leading from (5)
to (7) and find
(9) h{1,...,n} − hT ≥ h{1,...,n} − hT
for all ∅ 6= T ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. But for S = ∅ in (5), we obtain∑
T⊆{1,...,n}
|T | even
hT ≤
∑
T⊆{1,...,n}
|T | odd
lT
and hence, together with (9),
l{1,...,n} ≥ l{1,...,n} = h{1,...,n}.
But by definition h{1,...,n} ≥ l{1,...,n} and therefore this solution needs at least h{1,...,n}
subpixels, i.e. the solution given by 2.2 is optimal. 
We notice that in the first part of the proof of 4.1 we did not need the assumption δT = 1
for ∅ 6= T ( {1, . . . , n}. In fact, it is sufficient to assume hT 6= 0 where hT is defined by
(7). A short calculation proves that this is the case if S 6⊆ P(S) for a proper subset S of
{1, . . . , n}. Thus the first part of 4.1 proves:
Corollary 4.2. For S ⊆ P({1, . . . , n})\{∅, {1, . . . , n}}, S 6⊆ S for any proper subset S of
{1, . . . , n} and n even, Construction 2.2 is not optimal.
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Even more general we can prove:
Theorem 4.3. Let S ⊆ P({1, . . . , n})\{∅}. Let us assume that there exists a nonempty
subset T ∈ P({1, . . . , n})\S with |T | even and that S ∩ P(T ) 6⊆ P(T ′) for each proper
subset T ′ of T . Then Construction 2.2 is not optimal.
Proof. We apply 4.2 to S ∩ P(T ). For a proper subset T ′ of T we define hT ′ and lT ′ as
in the proof of 4.1. Formally we define hT = hT − 2 and lT = hT − 1 where hT is defined
by (7). Let δT = −1 and for T 6= S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} we define δS = 0 for S 6∈ S and δS = 1
otherwise.
Corresponding to (7) we define
hˆS =


lT +
∑
∅6=S′({1,...,n}
S′ 6⊆T
δS′2
|S′|−1 −
∑
S(S′⊆{1,...,n}
δS′2
|S′|−1−|S| for S 6⊆ T
hS +
∑
∅6=S′({1,...,n}
S′ 6⊆T
δS′2
|S′|−1 −
∑
S(S′⊆{1,...,n}
S′ 6⊆T
δS′2
|S′|−1−|S| for S ⊆ T
for ∅ 6= S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and lˆS = hˆS − δS .
An easy but tedious calculation corresponding to the one that was used in the proof of
Theorem 3.3 shows that hˆS , lˆS satisfy (5). Hence an S-extended visual cryptography
system with contrast levels hˆS , lˆS exists. This scheme has a smaller pixel-expansion than
the scheme given by Construction 2.2. 
5. Conclusions and further remarks
Equation (3) gives us a simple method to construct an S-extended visual cryptography
scheme with given contrast values lT and hT . Furthermore, for fixed n and S, equation (3)
leads to a linear programming problem which describes all possible S-extended visual
cryptography schemes. For small values of n this problem can easily be solved.
In this article we have given a full solution for the special cases S = P({1, . . . , n})\{∅} and
S = P({1, . . . , n})\{∅, {1, . . . , n}}. We close by presenting the following open problems:
(1) We conjecture:
Let S ⊆ P({1, . . . , n})\{∅}. Then Construction 2.2 is optimal for an
S-extended visual cryptography scheme if and only if for all ∅ 6= T 6∈ S
we have either |T | odd or S ∪ P(T ) ⊆ P(T ′) for some proper subset T ′
of T .
(2) An even harder problem is a full characterization of S-extended visual cryptogra-
phy schemes with minimal pixel expansion for arbitrary subsetsS of P({1, . . . , n}),
i.e. to find a formula for the minimal pixel expansion depending on S.
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